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ILLEGAL CORPORATE PRACTICES AND THE
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
ERIC D. ROITER*
INTRODUCTION
T HE mandatory disclosure and antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws' are a unique approach to federal regulation. In
contrast to most other laws, the securities laws apply not solely to
firms in a particular industrial or commercial sector but to virtually
every enterprise that draws capital from public investors.2 Because a
disclosure scheme, by its nature, lacks its own set of substantive
norms, publicly-held corporations are essentially free under the secur-
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar: B.A. 1970, University of Rhode Island;
J.D. 1973, L.L.M. 1981, Georgetown University; former Assistant General Counsel
to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The views expressed herein are those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the
author's former colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
1. The mandatory disclosure and antifraud provisions of the securities laws
pertinent to this Article are found in the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act or Securities
Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1976), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934
Act, Securities Exchange Act or Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1976). Under
the Securities Act, the core provisions are § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976) (registration
and prospectus requirements for an issuer's public offering of securities), and § 17(a),
15 U.S.C. § 7 7q (1976) (fraud prohibitions in the offer or sale of securities). Under
the Securities Exchange Act, the pertinent provisions are § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)
(1976) (annual and periodic reporting requirements for publicly-held issuers), §
14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) (proxy solicitation requirements), §§ 13(e) and
14(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(e), 78n(d) (1976) (issuer and third-party tender offer
requirements), § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) (prohibition of fraud in tender
offers), and § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) (fraud prohibitions in the purchase or
sale of securities).
2. At the same time, Congress has provided in the securities laws for substantive
regulation of market professionals- broker-dealers and investment advisers- invest-
ment companies and industry self-regulatory bodies, such as the exchanges and the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD). In contrast to the general
trend of deregulation, Congress has in recent years expanded regulation under the
securities laws to embrace others in, or at the periphery of, the securities markets. As
amended by the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97,
the Securities Exchange Act now requires registration and regulation of "securities
information processors," municipal securities dealers (including bank dealers), clear-
ing agencies, registrars and transfer agents. Securities Exchange Act, §§ lIA(b), 15B,
17A(b), (c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k-l(b), 78o-4(a), 78q-l(b), (c) (1976). Moreover, in the
1975 Amendments, Congress established the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
as a new self-regulatory body. Securities Exchange Act § 15B(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
4(b) (1976).
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ities laws to order their own affairs. Corporations are restrained,
however, by a myriad of other federal and state laws. The task of
enforcing these laws is often entrusted to specialized agencies, which
are expected to develop an expertise in their respective areas and to
exercise discretion in deciding whether, and under what circum-
stances, to initiate enforcement actions.
Inevitably, occasions arise in which unlawful conduct by a corpora-
tion has import under both a substantive statute and the securities
laws. When conduct is clearly illegal and likely to result in significant
financial loss, the two statutory schemes may readily coexist and,
indeed, complement one another. In other situations, the substantive
violation may be unclear, the likelihood of detection or prosecution
less than certain, and the damage to profitability, if any, difficult to
determine. In these circumstances, the role of a disclosure system is
more difficult to assess. Disclosure of illegal conduct falling within the
bounds of an expansive materiality standard may be of marginal
utility to investors, may burden corporations with unnecessary costs,
and may diminish the clarity and focus of corporate filings. Moreover,
practical and jurisprudential problems arise when the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) or a private plaintiff, in order to prove a
disclosure violation, must first prove the illegality of underlying con-
duct. This is particularly the case when the alleged underlying viola-
tion falls within the primary jurisdiction of another expert agency or
when the court before which the securities claim is pending would
otherwise lack jurisdiction to pass upon the substantive violation.
This Article addresses the legal and policy issues arising from the
disclosure obligations of the securities laws when corporate conduct is
illegal or "questionable" under other laws, and suggests an approach
to sharpen the contours of a duty to disclose corporate misconduct. No
attempt is made to present a perfectly ordered model. The decisions in
this area do not lend themselves to such an undertaking; a number
have been settled by consent, and others have been decided with little
attempt by the courts to enunciate principled standards.
From an examination of the case law and purposes underlying the
securities laws, however, several factors that bear on the duty to
disclose emerge. As addressed in this Article, these entail: (1) whether
a type of illegal conduct is material per se; (2) whether discovery or
cessation of illegal, or assertedly illegal, conduct may adversely affect
future profitability, even if current earnings would not be substan-
tially affected; (3) whether misleading or incomplete disclosure re-
flects adversely on the integrity of management; and (4) whether
specific line item reporting requirements apply to the practices in
question. Finally, cutting across these factors are problems of proof
and considerations of comity that arise when enforcement of the
securities laws depends upon an adjudication of conduct under sepa-
rate legal standards.
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To lay the groundwork, this Article begins with a brief overview of
the securities law disclosure scheme.
I. PURPOSES OF DISCLOSURE
The disclosure requirements applicable to businesses whose shares
are publicly traded form the heart of the federal securities laws.3
Through enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Congress sought to ensure that important
information bearing upon an issuer's business would be regularly
disclosed to the market place, providing all participants the opportu-
nity to make informed investment judgments. 4 Congress's imposition
of affirmative disclosure obligations reflects the unique characteristics
of securities. In contrast to products that lend themselves to physical
inspection, securities are intangible interests and their trading takes
place in an impersonal market. In light of these factors, and taking
into account the central role of the securities markets, President
Roosevelt in 1933 called for rules to govern those markets which
differed from those regulating other forms of commerce.5
3. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977);
Berman v. Gerber Prod. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1321 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Felt v.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
4. Addressing the disclosure provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce explained that the excessive
speculation characterizing the securities markets in the 1920's was attributable, in
part, to "inadequate corporate reporting which keeps [investors] in ignorance of
necessary factors for intelligent judgment of the values of securities." H.R. Rep. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934). To provide the investor with "'an intelligent basis
for forming his judgment as to the value of the securities he buys or sells," id. at 11,
Congress supplemented the public offering disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act
with the periodic reporting requirements of the 1934 Act. Through this approach,
business facts that had been "the exclusive perquisite of powerful banking and
industrial groups" would be available to all. Id. at 13; accord SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) ("The only regulatory
objective [of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5] is that access to material information be enjoyed
equally, but this objective requires nothing more than the disclosure of basic facts so
that outsiders may draw upon their own evaluative expertise in reaching their own
investment decisions with knowledge equal to that of the insiders."), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969), see SEC v. Monarch Fund, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. See.
L. Rep. (CCH) 97,148, at 96,337 (2d Cir. Oct. 23, 1979). The securities laws,
however, stop short of requiring that all investors receive equal access to all pertinent
information regardless of its nature or its source. Thus, the Supreme Court has
rejected the notion that the securities laws require a "'parity-of-information" where
neither party to a trade has inside corporate information or owes the other an
affirmative duty to disclose. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1980).
5. The President, in his message to Congress, explained that proposed legisla-
tion, ultimately enacted as the Securities Act of 1933, "adds to the ancient rule of
caveat emptor, the further doctrine 'let the seller also beware.' " S. Rep. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933); H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). The
strategy of mandatory disclosure, adopted in the wake of a decade of excessive
speculation, was thus intended "to bring into the full glare of publicity those cle-
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The choice of a disclosure model in the 1933 Act, however, reflects
Congress's rejection of a more intrusive model, the "merit" regulation
of securities issuances 6 that many statcs employ. 7 This federal strat-
egy carried over to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; the Senate
version of the legislation leading to the 1934 Act had, in fact, expressly
provided that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing
the Commission to interfere with the management of the affairs of an
issuer." 8  The Securities Exchange Act, as adopted, does not contain
express language to that effect because Congress thought it unneces-
sary."
While fostering informed investment decision-making is the funda-
mental purpose of the securities laws, Congress also intended to serve
at least three subsidiary purposes. First, Congress perceived that the
efficiency of the securities markets as a pricing mechanism would
improve as trading came to reflect the assessments of an informed
investing public.' 0 The second by-product was the enhancement of
investor confidence, which would lead in turn to increased stability in
ments of real and unreal values which may lie behind a security." Id. at 4; cf. SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) ("[T]he doctrines of
fraud and deceit which developed around transactions involving land and other
tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale of such intangibles as [investment]
advice and securities ....").
6. Indeed, both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act expressly prohibit persons from
representing that the SEC has passed upon the investment merits of any issuer's
securities. Securities Act of 1933, § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 77w (1976); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 26, 15 U.S.C. § 78z (1976).
7. "The approach [of'the blue sky laws] is a . . . paternalistic one: a state
agency decides whether each security satisfies specified statutory standards ... and,
if not, the security is not considered sound enough to be offered in the state." L. Loss,
Securities Regulation 36-37 (1951).
8. S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 13(d) (1934); see S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 20 (1934).
9. The Conference Report explained that "this provision is omitted from the
substitute [bill] as unnecessary, since it is not believed that the bill is open to
misconstruction in this respect." H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1934).
10. As the House Report accompanying the 1934 Act explained, "[t]he idea of a
free and open public market is built upon the theory that competing judgments of
buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings about a situation where the
market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price. Just as artificial manipulation
tends to upset the true function of an open market, so the hiding and secreting of
important information obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real
value .... The disclosure of information materially important to investors may not
instantaneously be reflected in market value, but despite the intricacies of securities
values truth does find relatively quick acceptance on the market." H. Rep. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934); see Mundheim, Selected Trends in Disclosure Require-
mentsfor Public Corporations, 3 Sec. Reg. L.J. 3, 4 (1975). The efficient pricing of
the "true" value of securities, coupled with federal authority to restrain the grant of
credit for the purchase of securities, would, in Congress's view, greatly lessen the
likelihood for excessive speculation. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 11
(1934).
784 [Vol. 50
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the securities markets and greater infusions of capital for industry and
commerce.'
1
Third, and most importantly, Congress understood that disclosure
would effectively deter corporate misconduct which could not with-
stand public scrutiny.'12  As the SEC's Disclosure Policy Study ex-
plained in 1969:
Although basically intended to inform, the disclosure provisions
of the early Acts were expected to accomplish more. Their princi-
pal architects were disciples of Justice Brandeis who, in 1913, made
the famous observation in Other People's Money that: "Publicity is
justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants..."
The fact that there is a significant degree of truth in such obser-
vations is attested by all who have worked with disclosure provi-
sions of the '33 and '34 Acts. The registration process has sometimes
been referred to as a housecleaning: one of its most valuable conse-
quences is the elimination of conflicts of interest and questionable
business practices which, exposed to public view, have what Justice
Frankfurter once termed "a shrinking quality." 3
The theory of deterrence as a secondary purpose of disclosure has
found general support in the courts and among commentators.14 The
11. Without such confidence, Congress explained, -easy liquidity of the resources
in which wealth is invested is a danger rather than a prop to the stability of [the
economic] system. When everything everyone owns can be sold at once, there must
be confidence not to sell." H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934).
12. See Staff of House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the SEC 565
(Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Report]. "Disclosure
was ... thought to be a particularly versatile regulatory concept that, with a
minimum of governmental interference to honest business, could be used to improve
the fiduciary relationship between those in control of publicly held business enter-
prises and the investing public by indirectly deterring fraud and other more subtle
forms of unethical behavior." Id.
13. SEC Staff, Disclosure to Investors (The Wheat Report) 50-51 (CCH Publ.
No. 5213, 1969) (footnotes omitted).
14. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972);
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); Anderson,
The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 Hastings
L.J. 311, 312-13 (1974); Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure,
32 Bus. Law. 887, 891 (1977); Mundheim, supra note 10, at 4, 27; Nelson, Bribes,
Kickbacks, and Political Contributions in Foreign Countries, 1976 Wis. L. Rev.
1231, 1239; Sommer, Therapeutic Disclosure, 4 Sec. Reg. L.J. 263, 265 (1976);
Sonde & Pitt, Utilizing the Federal Securities Laws to "Clear the Air! Clean the Sky!
Wash the Wind!," 16 How. L.J. 831, 842-43 (1971): Stevenson, The SEC and the
New Disclosure, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 50, 60-62 (1976): Weiss, Disclosure and Corpo-
rate Accountability, 34 Bus. Law. 575, 589-90 (1979). A prime example of disclosure
as deterrent is the SEC's "going private" rule. Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3
(1981). Among other items of disclosure required, a corporation seeking to shed its
publicly-held status must disclose to shareholders its belief in the fairness of the
1982] 785
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SEC's Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, comprised in
part of members of the securities industry and securities bar, tacitly
endorsed the proposition that disclosure may properly have a deter-
rent effect on conduct as a subsidiary purpose. 15
The precise range of deterrence, however, remains a matter for
debate. One school of thought advances disclosure to deter manage-
ment self-dealing and conflicts of interest." Others call for disclosure
duties to sweep more broadly, in order to deter illegal or unethical
corporate conduct that does not necessarily impair, and perhaps in
some cases may even advance, corporate profitability.' 7 This philo-
sophical difference, in great measure, accounts for the uncertainty
over the duty of issuers to disclose illegal conduct. Although courts
have reached varying results, the contours of disclosure obligations are
discernable.
II. GUIDEPOSTS TO DISCLOSURE OF ILLEGAL CONDUCT
ENGAGED IN BY ISSUERS OR THEIR AGENTS
A. Per Se Materiality
If the need for certainty and a desire to promote deterrence were
paramount objectives, they could be achieved through the application
"'going private" transaction and explain whether the corporation obtained an inde-
pendent appraisal of the fairness of the transaction's terms. See schedule 13E-3, items
8, 9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1981).
15. The Advisory Committee recommended that the SEC adopt the following
standard to guide the agency's administration of the securities laws: "The Commis-
sion's function in the corporate disclosure system is to assure the public availability in
an efficient and reasonable manner on a timely basis of reliable, firm-oriented
information material to informed investment and corporate suffrage decision-mak-
ing. The Commission should not adopt disclosure requirements which have as their
principal objective the regulation of corporate conduct." Advisory Committee Re-
port, supra note 12, at 305 (emphasis added). The SEC declined to endorse this
recommendation out of concern that the standard would invite fruitless debate and
litigation over whether regulation of corporate conduct in a particular instance was
the Commission's primary, rather than secondary, objective. Securities Act Release
No. 5906 (Feb. 15, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,505,
at 80,048. The Commission has, however, recognized that deterrence alone is an
inadequate basis upon which to require disclosure. Securities Act Release No. 5627
(Oct. 14, 1975), [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,310, at
85,713; see Sommer, supra note 14, at 265.
16. See Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1099, 1247
n.527 (1977) (deterrence should extend only to "unethical behavior by controlling
stockholders [and] ... not [to] misconduct standing alone"). Legislative history
speaks specifically to deterring conflicts of interest and breaches of fiduciary duty in
connection with insider trading, see H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1934), and in the solicitation of shareholder proxies. Id. at 14. Manipulation was t
second target of deterrence specifically identified by Congress. Id. at 11.
17. See Stevenson, supra note 14, at 53-66; Weiss, supra note 14, at 596-603.
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of a "bright line" standard treating as per se material any form of
corporate conduct known to be illegal, though yet to be adjudicated.'
Such an approach, however, clashes with well-settled notions of mate-
riality. The touchstone for materiality, as articulated by the Supreme
Court in the context of proxy solicitation, turns upon
[whether] there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable share-
holder would consider [an omitted fact] important in deciding how
to vote .... Put another way, there must be a substantial likeli-
hood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
the "total mix" of information made available.'
As the Supreme Court and lower courts have explained, the concept of
materiality entails selectivity. Unless the disclosure system permits the
filtering of facts of actual significance from a larger mass of facts, the
18. The presence of materially misleading statements or omissions is generally a
prerequisite to liability. For example, liability under § 11 of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976), hinges on a false statement of a "'material- fact in a
registration statement or the omission of a "material" fact necessary to make other
statements not misleading. See also Securities Act of 1933, § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d)
(1976) (Commission "stop order" proceeding): id. § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. 771(2) (1976)
(liability in private action arising from offer or sale of a security): id. § 17(a)(2), 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1976) (general antifraud prohibition): Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 9(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4) (1976) (false statements of material facts by
broker-dealers to induce trading in exchange-listed securities): id. § 14(e), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(e) (1976) (material misstatements or omissions in connection with tender
offers); rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981) (general antifraud prohibitions
governing purchase or sale of securities under the Exchange Act); rule 14a-9, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981) (antifraud prohibition governing proxy solicitations under
the Exchange Act). There are instances, however, when liability may attach even if
misleading statements or omissions are not material. See infra notes 108-11 and
accompanying text.
19. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). The Supreme
Court in TSC confined its materialit, formulation to the proxy rules. Nonetheless,
the TSC standard has been carried over to other provisions of the federal securities
laws, notably rule lob-5. See, e.g., Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273,
1293 n.9 (9th Cir. 1979); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir.
1979); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1330 (5th Cir. 1978): Holmes v. Bateson, 583
F.2d 542, 558 n.20 (1st Cir. 1978); Harkavy v. Apparel Indus., Inc., 571 F.2d 737,
741 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Hassig v. Pearson, 565 F.2d 644, 649-50 (10th
Cir. 1977); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 247-48 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d
1033, 1040 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); SEC v. National Student
Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 705 n.55 (D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. American Beef
Packers, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,079, at
91,869-70 (D. Neb. May 4, 1977). Indeed, the TSC court cited with approval cases
involving § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
445 n.8 (1976). One year after TSC, the Supreme Court again suggested that the
same materiality standard governed § 10(b) cases as well. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 n.14 (1977).
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
utility of disclosure to investors would be diminished.20 Indeed, un-
der the "buried facts" doctrine, a reporting company may incur liabil-
ity when material facts, although disclosed, are obscured by their
placement or by the inclusion of a mass of trivial information.2 1
Because the pertinence to investors of various forms of unlawful
corporate conduct may differ, no court has held that unlawful con-
duct, standing alone, is material per se. The SEC itself eschewed a per
se standard in the "sensitive payments" cases of the mid-1970's. In its
Questionable Payments Report to Congress in 1976,22 the SEC sum-
marized the enforcement actions that it had taken against fourteen
corporations and described its voluntary disclosure program, pursuant
to which scores of other corporations eventually provided generic
disclosure of "sensitive" payments. The SEC explained that the illegal-
ity of sensitive payments was not dispositive in determining a corpora-
tion's disclosure obligations, but was simply one factor, albeit "a
particularly important factor," in assessing materiality.2 3
20. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 433 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 934 (1977); Umbriac v. Kaiser, 467 F. Supp. 548, 553 (D. Nev..1979). The TSC
Court stated: "[I]f the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low, not only may the
corporation and its management be subjected to liability for insignificant omissions
or misstatements, but also management's fear of exposing itself to substantial liability
may cause it simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information-
a result that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking." TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976). Because an over-inclusive materiality
standard is self-defeating, the Supreme Court in TSC rejected the Seventh Circuit's
lower materiality threshold, which encompassed facts a reasonable investor "might"
have considered important in determining how to vote. Id. at 449. The Supreme
Court endorsed the more discriminating standard articulated by the Second and
Fifth Circuits. Id. at 445, 449; see Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579,
603-05 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1301-02 (2d Cir. 1973).
21. See, e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 774 (3d Cir.
1976); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565
(E.D.N.Y. 1971).
22. SEC, Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable
and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices (May 12, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Questionable Payments Report], reprinted in See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 353
(May 19, 1976).
23. Id. at 7. The SEC stated obliquely that "[w]here . . . payment violates
United States laws, the Commission has adhered to policies governing the need for
disclosure of violations of United States laws in other contexts." Id. As to foreign
payments, the SEC stated: "If the payment is illegal under the local law of a foreign
state-a fact which may not always be readily ascertainable- disclosure may be
required." Id. (emphasis added); see also Statement of Hon. Roderick M. Hills,
Chairman, SEC, Before the Subcomm. on Priorities and Economy in Government of
the Joint Economic Comm. (Jan. 14, 1976), reprinted in [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,364, at 85,966-67 (explaining a Commission determi-
nation that a corporation was not required to disclose past sensitive payments in view
of (1) the company's privately held status at the time of the payments, (2) the small
amounts involved, (3) the lowly official status of recipients, (4) non-involvement of
(Vol. 50
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To this general policy, the SEC has fashioned exceptions in two
areas. First, while the making of illegal political campaign payments
is not, standing alone, material, the SEC's Division of Corporation
Finance, in 1974, posited that any formal criminal charge of illegal
domestic campaign contributions, without regard to amount, must be
disclosed in 1933 Act registration statements and reports filed under
the Securities Exchange Act. 24 In a second area, the SEC, until quite
recently, required disclosure of all judicial or administrative proceed-
ings by a governmental body arising under environmental protection
laws or regulations, regardless of the amount of earnings or business at
stake.25
top management, and (5) accurate accounting for such payments by the company).
The SEC's disavowal of a per se materiality standard drew criticism from the House
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, chaired by Representative John Moss,
which called upon the agency to require detailed disclosure of any payment illegal
under domestic or foreign law. Staff of Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.. SEC
Voluntary Compliance Program on Corp. Disclosure 12 (Comm. Print 1976).
24. Securities Act Release No. 5466 (Mar. 8, 1974), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,699. Although the SEC's Division of Corporate
Finance stated that criminal adjudication of unlawful contributions must be dis-
closed, id., this broke little new ground, since line item disclosure of any criminal
conviction of a director or an officer within a preceding five year period was already
required in annual 10-K reports, item 12, 4 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 31,101, and
in S-1 registration statements. Item 16, 2 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 7123. The
Division suggested that disclosure may also be required of campaign contributions
that "may be illegal" although not formally charged, but recognized that no per se
rule could apply. Securities Act Release No. 5466 (Mar. 8, 1974). [1973-1974 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,699.
25. The Commission adopted the environmental disclosure requirement in Secur-
ities Act Release No. 5386 (Apr. 20, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 79,342. In later proceedings involving the Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil and other public interest groups, the Commission declined to approve a rule-
making petition to extend the disclosure requirement to private environmental litiga-
tion. National Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1036-37 (D.C. Cir.
1979); see Securities Act Release No. 5627 (Oct. 14, 1975), [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,310, at 85,718-19. The Commission based its
decision upon difficulties inherent in distinguishing private suits which may be
economically material from those seeking "substantially inflated" damages. 1d. at
85,719. It should be noted that environmental disclosure is in some respect sid
generis, because the SEC has relied not only upon its authority under the securities
laws, but under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4361 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), as well. See Securities Act Release No. 5386
(Apr. 20, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,342. But more
recently, the agency has taken the position that NEPA, while permitting added
disclosure, does not require unique disclosure rules for environmental matters. Open-
ing Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission at 61, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (agencies need only
"consider environmental issues just as they consider other matters within their man-
dates" (emphasis in original) (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v.
United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). On
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B. Financial Materiality
The limited instances in which disclosure of illegal, although unad-
judicated, conduct has triggered disclosure reinforce the premise that
illegality alone is generally not dispositive. Instead, the standard of
financial materiality, based on the premise that monetary gain is the
paramount, if not sole, concern of stockholders,2 6 must generally be
met. Apart from current earnings and losses, the standard of financial
materiality may require disclosure of matters that reflect upon the
stability or "quality" of earnings. Because investors seek to minimize
risks associated with any particular rate of return,2 7 the SEC's disclo-
sure rules demand adequate explanation of risks attendant to future
profitability. A company's prospectus must therefore prominently dis-
play special risks, -8 and in disclosure documents generally, companies
March 3, 1982, the Commission substantially relaxed disclosure requirements in this
area. An issuer need disclose an environmental proceeding in which a governmental
authority is a party only when the potential monetary sanction is $100,000 or
greater. Securities Act Release No. 6383 (Mar. 3, 1982).
26. In explaining prospectus disclosure, the House Report in 1933 stated that the
"type of information required to be disclosed is of a character comparable to that
demanded by competent bankers from their borrowers." H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933). In the same vein, the SEC has stated: "The Commission's
experience over the years in proposing and framing disclosure requirements has not
led it to question the basic decision of the Congress that, insofar as investing is
concerned, the primary interest of investors is economic. After all, the principal, if
not the only reason why people invest their money in securities is to obtain a return.
A variety of other motives are probably present in the investment decisions of
numerous investors but the only common thread is the hope for a satisfactory return,
and it is to this that a disclosure scheme intended to be useful to all must be primarily
addressed." Securities Act Release No. 5627 (Oct. 14, 1975), [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,310, at 85,721; accord United Hous. Found.,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) ("Because securities transactions are
economic in character Congress intended the application of these statutes to turn on
the economic realities underlying a transaction .... "); Feit v. Leasco Data Process-
ing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) ("a fact is 'material' in a
registration statement whenever a rational connection egists between its disclosure
and a viable alternative course of action by any appreciable number of investors").
But see National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 700
(D.D.C. 1974) ("There are many so-called 'ethical investors'. . .who want to invest
their assets in firms which are concerned about and acting on environmental prob-
lems of the nation. This attitude may be based purely upon a concern for the
environment . . . . Whatever their motive, this Court is not prepared to say that
they are not rational investors and that the information they seek is not material
information within the meaning of the securities laws.").
27. See Lewellen, The Cost of Capital, in V. Brudney & M. Chirelstein, Cases
and Materials on Corporate Finance 59-66 (2d ed. 1979). Stated otherwise, investors
demand higher rates of return for their assumption of higher risks. See H. Marko-
witz, Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments 5-7 (1959).
28. Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968), 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
3766.
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must disclose, for example, the dependency of the company upon one
or a few customers for any line of business, 29 any material portion of
government business subject to renegotiation of profits or termination
at the election of the government, 30 and any dependency upon foreign
operations for any line of business. 3' SEC rules also require inclusion
of any additional material information necessary to render representa-
tions made in disclosure documents, including financial statements,
not misleading. 32 These "catchall" requirements may be triggered by
any event that poses a significant new risk to the company's business. 33
Because information pertaining to lawful corporate activities or plans
must be disclosed if financially material, it would be paradoxical if a
corporation incurring, or about to incur, substantial economic loss
could avoid disclosure solely because its losses arise from illegal prac-
tices.
34
Stability of earnings may be seriously undermined if a company
must resort to illegal measures in its efforts to compete. It is upon this
basis that the SEC has predicated the obligation of an issuer to disclose
29. Regulation S-K, item 101(c)(1)(vii), 47 Fed. Reg. 11,404 (1982) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. § 229.101).
30. Id. item 101(c)(1)(ix), 47 Fed. Reg. 11,405 (1982) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 229.101).
31. Id. item 101(d)(2), 47 Fed. Reg. 11,405 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
229.101).
32. Securities Act rule 408, 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (1981) (1933 Act registration
statements); Securities Exchange Act rule 12b-20, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1981)
(1934 Act registration statements, annual and periodic reports): Securities Exchange
Act rule 14a-9(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1981) (proxy statements); schedule 14D-
1, item 10(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1981) (tender offers).
33. See Securities Act Release No. 5447 (Dec. 20, 1973), [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,607 (disclosure of impact of possible fuel
shortages).
34. So long as disclosure is required of the corporation and not an individual, no
serious fifth amendment problems are posed, because it is well-settled that the
privilege against self-incrimination is a "'personal privilege," Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973); Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913), and
accordingly is unavailable to organizations that have a separate legal existence. Bellis
v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1974) (partnership); United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 698 (1944) (labor union); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 383-85
(1911) (corporation). As a corollary, corporate agents cannot assert a personal privi-
lege against self-incrimination to resist demands for information made upon the
organization. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1974); Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361, 376 (1911). A separate line of cases requires disclosure-even by
individuals-of information under an -'essentially regulatory, not criminal" reporting
scheme. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (upholding requirement that
automobile drivers report accidents). Applying the Byers standard, the Second Cir-
cuit has held that the disclosure requirements of the securities laws are essentially
noncriminal and regulatory in nature, thus obviating the applicability of the fifth
amendment. United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 727-.28 (2d Cir.), cert. dended,
439 U.S. 824 (1978); SEC v. Radio Hill Mines Co., 479 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1973).
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illegal or "sensitive" payments to domestic or foreign officials. 35 A
theory of materiality based upon risks to earnings stability, however,
can be applied to a wider range of illegal corporate conduct. First,
unlawful practices may subject a company to substantial fines or
require substantial expenditures in order to continue operations. For
example, in In re United States Steel Corp. ,3 the SEC found that the
respondent omitted estimated future capital expenditures for pollution
control facilities required to satisfy clean water and air standards. The
internal estimates far exceeded sums that the company had spent in
earlier years. 37 In 1980, the SEC reached similar conclusions in In re
35. Questionable Payments Report, supra note 22, at 8. Inaccuracy in corporate
books and records in accounting for the disposition of corporate assets will heighten
"quality of earnings" materiality. The SEC found in the mid-1970's that financial
statements of companies making sensitive payments invariably were distorted to
conceal or obscure those payments. This falsification "cast[s] doubt upon [a compa-
ny's] whole system of accounting" which is an "essential component of the disclosure
system." Id. at 6-7. In Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,185 (Jan. 19, 1977),
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,896, the SEC proposed
rules that (1) required the maintenance of accurate books and records and an ade-
quate system of internal accounting controls, and (2) prohibited the falsification of
an issuer's accounting records and the making of false statements to the company's
auditors. Id. at 87,377-82. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), Pub.
L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), codified tile
recordkeeping and internal accountability provisions contained in these proposed
rules. See Securities Exchange Act §§ 13(b)(2)(A)-(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B)
(Supp. IV 1980). In 1979, the SEC adopted rules 13b-1 and 13b-2, 17 C.F.R. §§
240.13b2-1 to -2 (1981), to supplement the statutory requirements. The FCPA also
added a new § 30A to the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (Supp. IV
1980), to prohibit publicly held United States companies from making any payment
to a foreign governmental or political official, or to an intermediary, to influence
governmental or political party action. The SEC has stated that the various provi-
sions of the FCPA "d[o] not alter the existing obligation of [reporting] companies
adequately to disclose material questionable and illegal corporate payments and
practices." Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14478 (Feb. 15, 1978), 6 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 72,264 (announcing enactment of FCPA). At this writing, committees
in the 97th Congress are revising the accounting and antibribery features of the
FCPA, and some amendments are likely. The Senate has passed a bill, S. 708, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. S13,969-71 (1981), which, among other things,
transfers civil enforcement of § 30A from the SEC to the Justice Department and
narrows the liability of United States corporations and officers for foreign bribes by
intermediaries.
36. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,223 (Sept. 27, 1979), [1979-1980
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,319.
37. From 1974 through 1978, U.S. Steel spent $500 million on pollution control
facilities. The company's internal cost estimates for the years 1979-1983, not dis-
closed in registration statements or periodic reports, ranged as high as $1.8 billion.
Id. at 82,380 n.15. Although the SEC's line items required disclosure only of material
environmental control expenditures for the next two fiscal years, Securities Act
Release No. 5704 (Apr. 15, 1976), [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,495, at 86,291-92, the SEC held that U.S. Steel, having derived esti-
mates for several years beyond, was required to disclose them. [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 82,383-84. The SEC also found that U.S. Steel
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Occidental Petroleum Corp.,38 another administrative proceeding set-
tled by consent. In that case, disclosure deficiencies were attributable
to a wholly owned subsidiary, Hooker Chemical Company, which
filed reports that failed to reveal both the total costs required to
achieve compliance with environmental standards, and the potential
fines attributable to past non-compliance.3 9
Disgorgement of funds or renegotiation of profits comprise another
type of risk. For example, in Heit v. Weitzen 4 0 a government contrac-
tor's failure to disclose a contingent liability stemming from over-
charges to the federal government in *'cost-plus" contracts rendered
financial statements materially misleading.4' Similarly, in Gladwin
v. Medfield Corp. ,42 a health services company that had received
substantial Medicaid overpayments violated the proxy rules by failing
to tell shareholders of its contingent liability to return overpaid sums,
even though the exact amount of overpayments had yet to be deter-
mined.43
A third risk is the potential loss of license or other disability that
forecloses a line of business. In Gladwin, for example, Medicare's
fiscal agent suspended payments to the company until past overpay-
ments had been recovered. 44 This risk is also illustrated in a trilogy of
cases-Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp. 45 SEC v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing
Co.,46 and SEC v. American Beef Packers, Inc.47  In Cooke, the
district court found that proxy materials failed to advise shareholders
that the former chief executive officer, convicted of briber) to secure
cable television franchises, continued to play an active role in the
company's affairs. Because his association could cost the company its
federal licenses, the court held that the proxy statements were materi-
failed to disclose a number of governmental proceedings involving environmental
regulation. In this regard, the SEC interpreted its line item requirement pertaining
to any environmental "proceedings . . . by governmental authorities" to include
administrative proceedings initiated by a company, explaining that "[t]he obligation
to disclose is triggered whenever governmental authority is a party to any administra-
tive proceeding." Id. at 82,383.
38. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,950 (July 2, 1980), [1980 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 82,622.
39. Id. at 83,348-53. Most costs for past noncompliance were attributable to
Hooker Chemical, acquired by Occidental Petroleum in 196S. Id. at 83,347-48.
40. 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
41. Id. at 914.
42. 540 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1976).
43. Id. at 1269.
44. Id. at 1268.
45. 334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
46. 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
47. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,079 (D. Neb.
May 4, 1977).
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ally deficient. 48  Similarly, in American Beef Packers proxy state-
ments were found misleading for failing to disclose the existence of a
cash fund used to bribe federal meat inspectors. 49  In contrast to
Cooke, American Beef Packers involved unadjudicated, indeed un-
charged, bribery, and although small in amount,50 the payoffs were
an integral part of the company's operations. 51
In Schlitz, which involved kickbacks to retailers, the court found
that violations of the antifraud, reporting and proxy provisions of the
1934 Act were properly alleged, notwithstanding the small sums
paid. 52 The court reasoned that the success of the company's overall
operations could be shown to derive from these payments, and that
the company stood to lose its brewing license. 53
In any case when materiality turns upon the prospect of a future
event, the line between "fact" and mere speculation is a matter of
degree, because each involves an element of prediction.5 4 The Sec-
ond Circuit's seminal decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.55
calls for a two-part prediction, assessing (1) the likelihood that the
future event will eventually occur, and (2) the impact which the event
would have on the company's profitability. 5  Under this approach,
the likelihood of a future event need not fall within any precise range
of probability; even when the event is unlikely to occur, disclosure
may be called for if the event's impact would be profound. 57 At least
in the absence of insider profiteering, however, courts are reluctant,
48. 334 F. Supp. at 473-74. The court also reasoned that the company would be
disadvantaged in seeking franchises from honest municipal officials because of its
officer's record. Id. at 470-71.
49. SEC v. American Beef Packers, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sece.
L. Rep. (CCH) 96,079, at 91,872-73 (D. Neb. May 4, 1977).
50. The American Beef Packers court established that bribes totalling approxi-
mately $31,000 were paid in each of two fiscal years. Id. at 91,872. During that
period, the company ranked somewhere in the middle of the Fortune 500. Id. at
91,866.
51. Id. at 91,872. To generate the cash fund, the company sold an estimated
$500,000 worth of meat for cash and failed to record those sales in the company's
books. Id.
52. 452 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Wis. 1978). The alleged kickbacks of $3 million
represented only 3 % of net sales in 1976. Id.
53. Id.
54. To encourage companies' projections for future earnings and other forecasts,
the SEC has adopted "safe harbor" rules to exempt from liability companies whose
profit projections, made in good faith and based upon reasonable assumptions, turn
out to be wrong. See Securities Act Release No. 6084 (June 25, 1979), [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117 (adopting Securities Act rule 175, 17
C.F.R. § 230.175 (1981); Securities Exchange Act rule 3b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6
(1981)). For a discussion of the usefulness and potential pitfalls of financial forecasts
and other "soft" information, see Note, Disclosure of Future-Oriented Information
Under the Securities Laws, 88 Yale L.J. 338 (1978).
55. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
56. Id. at 849.
57. Id. at 849-50.
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given the advantage of hindsight, to impose antifraud liability %%,hen
"predictive" disclosure has been delayed or later shown to have been
inaccurate. 5s
Predicting the consequences of unadjudicated, illegal conduct may
be especially problematic. The probability of detection and successful
prosecution may vary greatly depending upon the nature of the mis-
conduct and the enforcement priorities and resources of governmental
authorities. 59 Requiring the public disclosure of these probabilities
may turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy, raising the prospect of detec-
tion and prosecution from mere possibility to likelihood.60
As Schlitz and American Beef Packers demonstrate, a duty to dis-
close past or planned illegal activities, if financially material, may
58. For example, in Harkavy v. Apparel Indus., Inc., 571 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.
1978), the Second Circuit, applying the Texas Gulf Sulphur balancing test, found
that the company and its officer had no rule lOb-5 liability for failure to disclose the
company's plans to expand into a promising new product line. The plaintiff had sold
his stock in 1969. The court of appeals held that discussions among management in
1969 were simply tentative. Id. at 741-42; see also Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 518 (10th Cir.) (per curiam) (timing of
earnings report is matter of business judgment), cert. denied. 414 U.S. 874 (1973);
Mesh v. Bennett, 481 F. Supp. 904, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no rule 14a-9 violation for
failure to provide estimate of the total cost of changes to company's executive
incentive stock purchase plan, because such a statement "would have been only
speculation"); Marks v. Lainoff, 466 F. Supp. 301, 302 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (al-
though merger between defendant company and another may have been discussed,
no violation of rule 14a-9 because "merger plans appear to be vague and indefinite at
best"). But see Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 490 (9th Cir. 1974)
(earnings forecast must have reasonable basis when made); Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1302-03 (2d Cir. 1973) (proxy statement for merger
inadequately advised shareholders of plan to sell plants of acquired company). The
SEC itself recognizes that companies that make earnings projections or other fore-
casts do not automatically incur liability if their predictions are later proven wrong.
See supra note 54.
59. Although predictive disclosure which must take into account the actions of a
foreign country is particularly speculative, the SEC has suggested that a company
making sensitive payments abroad may have to disclose the risk that a foreign nation
could expropriate the company's assets located within its borders. Questionable
Payments Report, supra note 22, at 5. Because of the enormous impact of expropria-
tion, even its mere possibility may suffice to require disclosure under the Texas Gulf
Sulphur approach.
60. A company may contend that even if its unlawful conduct were known to the
government, the chances of prosecution and sanction would be slight. In SEC v. Jos.
Schlitz Breing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978), for example, the company
contended in a motion to dismiss that a suspension of its license was unlikely, given
the approach historically taken by the Department of Treasury of not bringing
criminal prosecutions under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. §§
201-212 (1976). Id. at 830. The court, in denying the motion to dismiss, drew some
support from the allegation that the government had previously warned the company
in 1973 to stop its practice of paying kickbacks. Id. The pendency of a criminal
indictment against the company, id. at 832-33, may also have been persuasive. The
court, however, did not expressly rely on this post hoc event in reaching its decision.
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require, in effect, self-accusation by the company. In Amalgamated
Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co.," the district
court departed from the reasoning found in those cases and posited
that the proxy rules simply could not be read to require disclosure of
management's plans to violate the labor laws. The court rejected "a
parsing of the words of the [proxy] rule," instead relying upon its
"overall understanding" of rule 14a-9, and stated:
No matter how the proxy rule is construed, indeed even if it explic-
itly stated such a duty, corporate management would not announce
in proxy literature an intention to violate laws. It is simply contrary
to human nature. The rule, if it were construed to require this,
would never succeed in its purpose of bringing such disclosure to
the shareholders. 62
The J.P. Stevens court, however, failed to appreciate that a company
which plans to pursue illegal activities does have an alternative to self-
accusation-to conduct the company's affairs in compliance with the
law. Moreover, the court overlooked the more basic proposition that
disclosure of any adverse fact, whether relating to illegal conduct or
not, may be contrary to human nature and that a company, if given a
choice, would often avoid the timely disclosure of unfavorable, al-
though material, information. It is for this very reason that the secur-
ities laws impose mandatory disclosure obligations embracing both
adverse and favorable financially material information. 3 As addi-
tional cases in this area are decided upon financial materiality
grounds, it seems unlikely that many courts will accept the J.P.
Stevens rationale that the self-accusatory nature of disclosure some-
how detracts from materiality.
61. 475 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot per curiam, 638 F.2d 7
(2d Cir. 1980).
62. Id. at 332; cf. Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981) (unadjudi-
cated corporate bribes, absent kickbacks or other self-dealing, not material under
proxy rules); SEC v. Chicago Helicopter Indus., Inc., No. 79-C-0469, slip op. at 4
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 1980) (unadjudicated violation of banking laws by corporate
directors not material, since "[i]t is unlikely that the materiality requirement of
Section 10(b) was ever intended to require management to accuse itself of antisocial
behavior").
63. Thus, the SEC in its amicus curiae brief filed with the Second Circuit in J.1'.
Stevens stated: "[I]t is clear that future plans of a corporation must be disclosed
where they are material and legal, and there is no basis for concluding that disclosure
obligations may be avoided by making future illegal plans. The very concept of
disclosure may be contrary to human nature, in that management might prefer to
conceal all unfavorable information about a company, including such matters as
financial losses. Nevertheless, the essence of the federal securities laws, as stated in
the preamble to the Securities Act of 1933, is 'to provide full and fair disclosure.' "
Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission, amicus curiae, at 17-18,
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 638 F.2d 7
(2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis in original) (per curiam).
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C. Illegal Practices and Integrity of Managenent
The primacy with which investors view financially important infor-
mation may suggest that there is little room left for any other measure
of materiality under the securities laws. Indeed, the SEC in the late
1970's, in considering rulemaking petitions that called for the adop-
tion of disclosure rules covering a host of social policy issues, based its
rejection of such proposals upon a financial materiality standard.6
The SEC concluded that if economic concerns were not preeminent,
the bounds of materiality would be difficult, if not impossible, to fix. 5
Furthermore, the SEC explained that requiring disclosure of informa-
tion bearing upon matters of social policy, which may be sought only
by "limited segments of the investing public" without regard to the
economic importance of that information, would, in effect, compel a
subsidy of the costs of such additional disclosure by corporations and
shareholders. 66 In light of these considerations, after elaborate ad-
64. In its release seeking comment on disclosure rules sought by environmental
interest groups, the SEC stated: "'The [Securities] Acts and the relevant legislative
history suggest that a prime expectation of the Congress was that the Commission's
disclosure authority be used to require the dissemination of information which is or
may be economically significant." Securities Act Release No. 5627 (Oct. 14, 1975),
[1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,310, at 85,710.
65. The Commission stated: "'As a practical matter, it is impossible to provide
every item of information that might be of interest to some investor in making
investment and voting decisions .... [Plarticipants in the proceeding suggested
more than 100 topics concerning which they desired disclosure. A disclosure docu-
ment which incorporated each of the suggestions would consist of excessive and
possibly confusing detail .... ." Id. at 85,712.
66. Id. at 85,712-13. By implication, the SEC, in referring to "limited segments
of the investing public," suggested that determinations of materiality could perhaps
turn on empirical measurements of the number of investors who deemed particular
items of information significant in making investment or voting decisions. Presum-
ably, information bearing on a company's trading with South Africa, even if insignif-
icant from an earnings standpoint, might be material for particular companies if a
clear majority of their investors place importance on such disclosure. Elsewhere in its
release, the SEC retreated from the implication that materiality may be shaped by
periodic sampling of investor interest. Such an approach 'would at best produce
results that might rapidly become outdated in light of the shifting and fluctuating
nature of public opinion and the focus on popular opinion from time to time." Id. at
85,712. In its brief on appeal in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606
F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979), however, the Commission, by use of a double negative,
reserved the possibility that materiality standards, in the exercise of the Commission's
discretion, could be derived through empirical measurement of investor concerns.
See Opening Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission at 55 n.68, Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (although
disclosure of financial information "is the raison d'etre of the disclosure provisions of
the securities laws. . . it does not follow that the Commission may not consider, in
198.2]
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ministrative proceedings and extensive litigation, the SEC declined to
adopt proposals to require certain "social" disclosures bearing upon a
company's impact on the environment and upon the company's equal
employment opportunity practices.67
While economic concerns may be the touchstone of materiality for
investors who are deciding whether to buy or sell securities, the con-
cept of materiality has traditionally been thought to have a broader
scope in the corporate suffrage setting. In providing the SEC with
authority to prescribe disclosure rules governing the proxy solicitation
process,0 8 Congress understood that information concerning the integ-
rity and fidelity of corporate management was of great importance to
investors when called upon to elect directors or approve proposals
advanced by management. 9 Thus, even when illegal corporate con-
deciding what disclosure rules to adopt, the nature of investor interest in various
types of information" (emphasis omitted)). The Commission has, in fact, placed
weight on investor surveys in fashioning certain disclosure rules. See Securities Act
Release No. 5949 (July 28, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCIH)
81,649, at 80,618 n.7 (adopting disclosure rules for legal proceedings involving
management as parties). There is, moreover, some judicial support for empirically
derived materiality. See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp.
544, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
67. The SEC thus specifically declined to adopt disclosure rules requiring: (1) a
listing of all pending environmental or equal employment opportunity litigation, (2)
a statement of the company's "environmental policy"; (3) a summary of all expendi-
tures made to satisfy environmental standards: (4) a comprehensive explanation of
the effects which corporate operations have on the environment; and (5) statistics
bearing upon equal employment opportunity within the company. Securities Act
Release No. 5627 (Oct. 14, 1975), [1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
80,310, at 85,717-1.9, 85,723-25. The SEC did propose to require in registration
statements and in periodic reports and proxy solicitation materials disclosure of a list
of environmental compliance reports filed by a company within a twelve-month
period that indicated failure to meet environmental standards. Secondly, the SEC
proposed to require in certain registration and reporting forms disclosure of esti-
mated material capital expenditures for environmental control facilities for at least
the current and succeeding fiscal years. In subsequent action, the SEC adopted the
"capital expenditures" proposal but declined to adopt the "compliance report" pro-
posal. Securities Act Release No. 5704 (May 6, 1976), [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,495. The Commission's disposition of the rule-making
petitions was sustained by the D.C. Circuit in Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
68. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act requires proxies to comply with
"such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe .... " 15 U.S.C. §
78n(a) (1976). The SEC has implemented this authority through rules 14a-l to 14a-
12, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to -12 (1981). See generally TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 (1976) (§ 14(a) enacted to promote the free
exercise of stockholders' voting rights); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
381 (1970) (same); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 4126, 431-32 (1964) (speaking of
the "broad remedial purposes" of § 14(a), and explaining that Congress perceived
"[f]air corporate suffrage [as] an important right that should attach to every equity
security bought on a public exchange" (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 13 (1934))).
69. A Senate Report in 1934 explained that: "Too often proxies are solicited
without explanation to the stockholder of the real nature of the questions for which
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duct may have little immediate impact on corporate profitability,
materiality may yet be present if this information is pertinent to
investors in assessing the integrity of management.
Although viewed as a separate standard of materiality, "manage-
ment integrity" is, in a sense, closely tied to financial materiality. 0
Shareholders are no more altruistic than others: They do have an
interest, however, in ensuring that corporate fiduciaries subordinate
any self-interest that conflicts with the duty to maximize corporate
profitability. Consistent with their general aversion to risks, prudent
shareholders seek to avoid the risk of loss which may arise from
management self-dealing. While an isolated instance of self-dealing
may be inconsequential, the opportunity for repetition may be impor-
tant from a strictly financial standpoint.
Because of this congruence with financial materiality, -integrity of
management" materiality most clearly applies when management ob-
scures facts regarding self-dealing or conflicts of interest.7 -  In
authority to cast his vote is sought. For example, in one case . . . proxies were
solicited ... by means of a letter which purported to describe certain transactions
... [but] which omitted all mention of other important details such as previously
granted secret options in the corporation's stock, and the president's individual
interest in an underwriting agreement made by the corporation, which furnished the
real motive behind the request for ratification." S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
12 (1934); see also 78 Cong. Rec. 7861-62 (statement of Congressman Lea recounting
instances of management voting itself "vast bonuses out of all proportion to what
legitimate management would justify" and other abuses which raise questions over
both the "integrity of ... management" and the "prudence of ... investment" in
such corporations).
70. Indeed, an early case in which the SEC articulated the "integrity of manage-
ment" theory involved a public offering of securities, not a solicitation of proxies. In
re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964). The SEC in Franchard reasoned: "Of
cardinal importance in any business is the quality of its management .... In many
respects, the development of disclosure standards adequate for informed appraisal of
management's ability and integrity is a difficult task. . . . Managerial talent consists
of personal attributes, essentially subjective in nature, that frequently defy meaning-
ful analysis through the impersonal medium of a prospectus. Direct statements of
opinion as to managements ability, which are not susceptible to objective verifica-
tion, may wel create an unwarranted appearance of reliability if placed in a pro-
spectus. The integrity of management-its willingness to place its duty to public
shareholders over personal interest-is an equally elusive factor for the application of
disclosure standards. Evaluation of the quality of management-to whatever extent
it is possible-is an essential ingredient of informed investment decision. A need so
important cannot be ignored, and in a variety of ways the disclosure requirements of
the Securities Act furnish factual information to fill this need." Id. at 169-70 (foot-
notes omitted).
71. Id. at 170. In Franchard, the promoter's diversion of corporate assets for
personal use amounted to no more than 1.5% of the company's assets. Id. at 171.
72. Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 796-97 (2d Cir. 1979); Bertoglio v. Texas
Int'l Co., 488 F. Supp. 630, 658 (D. Del. 1980); SEC v. Kalvex Inc., 425 F. Supp.
310, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Rafal v. Ceneen, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. See.
L. Rep. (CCH) 93,505, at 92,441 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1972); Robinson v. Penn Cent.
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Maldonado v. Flynn,7 3 shareholders in a derivative suit alleged that
proxy solicitation for the election of directors was materially mislead-
ing for failing to disclose actions taken by directors in connection with
the company's stock option plan for key employees. Allegedly in antic-
ipation of the company's tender for its own stock at a premium, a
quorum of directors voted to amend the company's stock option plan
to permit six senior officers, four of whom were also directors, to
accelerate their purchase of company stock. The directors also voted
to grant interest-free loans to finance the purchases. The Second
Circuit held that failure to disclose the self-interest of four directors in
these amendments to the stock option plan was actionable under the
proxy rules, 74 because self-dealing by directors is a key indicium of
their qualifications to serve as corporate fiduciaries.75 Similarly, the
court in Bertoglio v. Texas International Co."0 held that management
breached the proxy rules by omitting mention of changes in the com-
pany's stock option plan which were advantageous to directors and
officers by increasing the likelihood of early vesting. Although finding
the facts "less compelling" than those in Maldonado because manage-
ment ultimately did not reap any benefit, 77 the court explained that
shareholders were entitled to know not only about actual abuse, but
"opportunities for abuse" as well. 8 The court thus ordered the elec-
tion of directors set aside and required a resolicitation of proxies from
shareholders. 79
In both Maldonado and Bertoglio, omissions bearing on self-dealing
rendered express statements in the proxy statement misleading,
Co., 336 F. Supp. 655. 658 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Beatty v. Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169, 174
(S.D. Iowa 1970).
73. 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979).
74. The Second Circuit stated: "This claim does not present merely another
attempt to use § 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 as an avenue for access to the federal courts in
order to redress alleged mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duty on the part of
corporate executives . . . . [T]he alleged misleading statements and non-disclosures
involve matters of direct and deep concern to shareholders in the exercise of their
right to vote, which the Exchange Act expects to be fully disclosed in proxy solicita-
tions for election of officers and directors." Id. at 796.
75. The court observed: "Since self-dealing presents opportunities for abuse of a
corporate position of trust, the circumstances surrounding corporate transactions in
which directors have a personal interest are directly relevant to a determination of
whether they are qualified to exercise stewardship of the company." Id. The Second
Circuit drew additional support from the applicability of specific line item disclosure
requirements under the proxy rules dealing with management remuneration. Id,
76. 488 F. Supp. 630 (D. Del. 1980).
77. Id. at 647.
78. Id. (citing Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 796 (2d Cir. 1979)).
79. 488 F. Supp. at 662-63. The court ordered this relief, notwithstanding the
"unclean hands" of proxy opponents who themselves were found to have violated the
proxy rules. Id. at 662. But see Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders
Comm., 354 F. Supp. 895 (D. Del. 1973) (proxy violations by both sides; no relief
awarded).
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thereby creating liability under rule 14a-9 for "half-truths." 80 Going
one step further, in Rafal v. Geneen,81 the district court found that a
proxy statement omitting mention of pending litigation made an im-
plicit representation of management integrity misleading. 2 The
court stated that
in their proxy statement they have elegant pictures of the directors
and precise notations of their academic background and corporate
experience. In short, these qualifications suggest an imprimatur of
extraordinary excellence, responsibility and good judgment-on
the basis of their past positions in the corporate world and in the
nation. 3
One hurdle faced by plaintiffs in self-dealing cases, however, is the
distinction between fact and motive. As long as objective data are
accurately disclosed to shareholders, no liability attaches if a company
chooses not to characterize the motive or "true purpose" underlying a
particular transaction.8 4 As the Second Circuit recognized in Gold-
berg v. Meridor, 5 insiders need only disclose the facts bearing on the
conflict of interest, and are not compelled to employ "pejorative
nouns or adjectives." 86  Even if material, according to some courts,
80. Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1979); Bertoglio v. Texas
Int'l Co., 488 F. Supp. 630, 659-61 (D. Del. 1980). Failure to disclose material facts
does not, ipso facto, create antifraud liability. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 232-33 (1980) (no liability under rule lOb-5 for silence in the purchase or sale of
securities, absent an affirmative duty to disclose).
81. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) J 93,505 (E.D. Pa.
May 8, 1972).
82. Id. at 92,441. The court found the proxy statements misleading for ignoring
that three director nominees were defendants in a derivative action charging a
"violation" under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. Id. Notwithstanding the
court's characterization, § 16(b) is incapable of "violation." It does not, by its terms,
prohibit insiders from engaging in short-swing trading, see D. Cook & M. Feldman,
Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 385, 407 (1953)
(§ 16(b) "merely provide[s] for civil liability to the corporation for any profits which
may have been realized from the short-swing trading"), and those who do are not
subject to SEC prosecution for that reason alone. 3B H. Bloomenthal, Securities and
Federal Corporate Law § 10.02 (rev. ed. 1981).
83. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,442. The court
in Rafal appeared to apply the "might" standard rejected by the Supreme Court in
TSC four years later. The Rajal court stated: "No substantial reason has been given
as to why IT&T shareholders were not informed of these suits, and no one could
argue that the information would have been 'trivial' or irrelevant to some stockhold-
ers.... I am not unaware of the facts of corporate proxy life. Maybe it won't make
any difference to a majority, maybe it will make a difference to only a few, but those
few cannot be precluded from knowing the salient facts." Id.
84. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
85. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
86. Id. at 218 n.8; see Rodman v. The Grant Found., 608 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir.
1979); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co.,
606 F.2d 602, 610 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980): Selk v. St. Paul
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the motive of management to maintain control is so obvious that
omitting to disclose that point is not misleading.87
When misconduct not involving self-dealing is concerned, courts
generally have declined to predicate materiality on an "integrity"
standard. 8 In Lyman v. Standard Brands Inc. ,89 for example, share-
holders contended that a proxy statement seeking ratification of an
auditor's appointment was misleading for omitting that three former
employees in a branch office of the auditor had been indicted for
securities fraud and that the firm itself had been named as an unin-
dicted co-conspirator. Although recognizing the viability of "manage-
ment integrity" materiality,90 the court found no material omission
since "[t]he indictment of three employees in [the auditing firm's]
office which has had no connection with Standard Brands audit has
only the most tenuous relationship to the shareholders' selection of the
corporation's independent auditors." 9' Similarly, the Second Circuit,
in Seibert v. Sperry Rand Corp., 92 found no deficiency in a company's
proxy statement which did not mention that a director nominee was
also a director of another company plagued by labor disputes. The
court of appeals concluded that vagaries of injury to "corporate im-
age" do not suffice to establish materiality. 93
Ammonia Prods. Inc., 597 F.2d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 1979); Biesenbach v. Guenther,
588 F.2d 400, 402 (3d Cir. 1978); Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759, 765 (8th Cir.
1978); Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l Co., 488 F. Supp. 630. 650 (D. Del. 1980); Lewis v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 481 F. Supp. 1199, 1204 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Lavin v. Data
Systems Analysts Inc., 443 F. Supp. 104, 107 (E.D. Pa. 1977), afjd, 578 F.2d 1374
(3d Cir. 1978); Falkenberg v. Baldwin, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 96,086, at 91,911 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 1977). But see SEC v. Parklane
Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083, 1086 (2d Cir. 1977) (proxy statement misleading in
failing to disclose that repayment of personal debts of majority stockholder was
purpose behind going-private merger).
87. See, e.g., Rodman v. The Grant Found., 608 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 1979);
O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964); Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l Co., 488
F. Supp. 630, 650 (D. Del. 1980); Falkenberg v. Baldwin, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,086, at 91,911 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 1977).
88. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 96,587 (1st Cir. Oct. 26, 1978); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile
Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
vacated as moot per curiam, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v.
United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249, 1289 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Lyman v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 794, 798 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
89. 364 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
90. Id. at 797 ("full disclosure of pending litigation is especially important if it
has any bearing on the competence or motives or integrity of the soliciting direc-
tors").
91. Id. at 798.
92. 586 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1978).
93. Id. at 952. The court of appeals also noted that J.P. Stevens' labor record had
been widely reported in the media and was a matter of public knowledge. Thus,
Sperry Rand's proxy statement was not misleading for not repeating information
already in the public domain. Id.
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In cases when management's actions, although perhaps ill con-
ceived, were undertaken solely to advance corporate interests, courts
have been even more reluctant to find disclosure violations. In Ainal-
gamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co.,9 4
the district court observed that such conduct, whether legal or not, is
entitled under state law to the protection afforded by the business
judgment rule. In the court's view, a policy to violate the labor laws
was a matter of business judgment which need not be disclosed in
proxy solicitations. 95 The Ninth Circuit articulated similar reasoning
in Gaines v. Haughton,98 a proxy case arising from illegal foreign
payments paid by Lockheed in the 1970's. Although self-dealing by
directors may be "presumptively material," the court held that mis-
management is "never material" under proxy rules,97 and accordingly
dismissed the shareholders' complaint. 8 Invoking the policy reasons
of Santa Fe Industries v. Green,"' the Ninth Circuit emphasized that
claims of mismanagement belong in state court and that "if all else
fails," shareholders can sell their stock.'°0
94. 475 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot per curiam, 638 F.2d 7
(2d Cir. 1980).
95. Id. at 331. While rejecting "integrity" materiality, the J.P. Stevens court
failed to evaluate the financial materiality of the company's labor policy. The proxy
rules do not exclude information regarding wasting of corporate assets simply be-
cause management could invoke the business judgment rule if sued in state court.
Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981), requires the disclosure of any material fact
necessary to avoid the misleading presentation of other facts set forth in the proxy
statement. The J.P. Stevens court, failing to address economic materiality, instead
knocked down a straw man, stating that: "As to plaintiffs' allegation that Stevens'
labor policy has resulted in significant expenses, management is clearly not required
to submit in proxy statements . . . all business judgments whenever it would be
possible for shareholders to disagree with their efficacy or wisdom." 475 F. Supp. at
331.
96. 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 11,
1982).
97. Id. at 776-77.
98. Id. at 780. Prior to passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, see
supra note 35, foreign bribes were not explicitly prohibited under United States law.
The Ninth Circuit limited its holding to "non-criminal [directors'] conduct in proxy
solicitations for their re-election," 645 F.2d at 777 n.24, and, thus, left unresolved
whether criminal conduct not involving self-dealing is material under the proxy
rules.
99. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
100. 645 F.2d at 779. In support of a self-dealing/mismanagement dichotomy, the
Ninth Circuit cited Santa Fe for the proposition that no antifraud cause of action is
available when the "essence" of a complaint involves allegations of breach of fiduci-
ary duty. Id. at 779 n.33. In contrast to Gaines, however, Santa Fe presented no
allegation of deception, and the Supreme Court held only that breach of fiduciary
duty alone-without deception-did not fall within rule lOb-5. 430 U.S. at 474-76.
Indeed, the Santa Fe Court distinguished cases in which "breaches of fiduciary duty
held violative of Rule 10b-5 included some element of deception." Id. at 474-75; see
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)
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In a related line of cases, private litigants have met with a singular
lack of success in proxy suits brought to recover money damages or
restitution from corporate managers who have paid bribes or made
questionable payments to improve corporate earnings. Even if proxy
materials were misleading in regard to the qualifications of directors,
courts have held that solicitation of proxies to elect directors lacks a
sufficient causal nexus to later payment of bribes or other illegal
conduct to permit monetary relief.' 0l As one district court reasoned,
a "but for" standard of causation is simply too broad and would
("Congress. . . did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute no more than
internal corporate mismanagement." (emphasis added)). The Ninth Circuit Itself has
acknowledged that a single set of facts may give rise to both fiduciary duties and
securities antifraud violations. Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1291
(9th Cir. 1979) ("every breach of fiduciary duties is [not] necessarily immune from
invocation of [rule lOb-5]"). Indeed, concealing facts that may hamper the ability of
shareholders to obtain relief in a state court for breach of fiduciary duty may
constitute a deception under the securities laws. Id. at 1292; see infra notes 122-26
and accompanying text; see, e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d
641, 645-47 (3d Cir. 1980); Alabama Farm Bureau M/lut. Casualt, Co. v. American
Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602, 614 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820
(1980); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 220-21 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1069 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 250 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
101. Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Lewis v. Valley, 476 F. Supp. 62
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Herman v. Beretta, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,574 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1978); In re Tenneco, Inc. See. Litig., 426 F.
Supp. 1187 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977); Limmer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,111 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1977): Lewis
v. Elam, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,013 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 5, 1977); Levy v. Johnson, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,899 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 1977); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); cf. Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1025 (3d Cir.), cert. denied.
434 U.S. 940 (1977) (no causal nexus between election of directors and later redemp-
tion of stock); Umbriac v. Kaiser, 467 F. Supp. 548, 555 (D. Nev. 1979) ("more In the
way of causation must be shown in [proxy] suits where damages are sought"): Halle
& Stieglitz, Filor, Bullard Inc. v. Empress Int'l, Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 217, 223-24 (D.
Del. 1977) (no causation between election of directors and subsequent director
approval of going private transaction). But see Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp.,
609 F.2d 650, 652-54 (2d Cir. 1979) (causation may be shown to set aside election of
directors for failing to disclose bribe payment in proxy materials), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 951 (1980). The district court in Weisberg distinguished Herman, Linner find
Levy by explaining that "[iun [those] cases . . . the plaintiff sought damages because
of allegedly improper payments, which did not require shareholder approval. The
causal link between the proxy solicitation for the election of the directors and the
injury complained of-the improper payments-was attenuated at best. In the In-
stant case, however, the challenged 'transaction' is the election of the directors, and
we have no doubt that the 'proxy solicitation itself . . . was an essential link in the
accomplishment' of that transaction." Id. at 654 (citations omitted).
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largely federalize state fiduciary law.10 2 A number of these cases, as a
separate ground for their holdings, have found that materialith is
lacking, given the absence of self-dealing. 10 3
A minority of courts have, however, applied management integrity
materiality to misconduct other than self-dealing. In Berkman v. Rust
Craft Greeting Cards, Inc.,'0 4 an investment banking firm, retained
to appraise the shares of a takeover target in a friendly cash tender
offer, failed to disclose its purchase of a large block of the target's
convertible debentures. The investment banker later did so inform
four directors of the company, who, in turn, failed to apprise others
prior to a board meeting called to consider the appraisal. In granting
a motion to enjoin the annual meeting, the court held that the direc-
tors' misfeasance was material and rejected the contention that the
proxy rules required disclosure only of self-dealing. 05 Other decisions
that apply management integrity materiality have been bolstered by
prior adjudication of underlying illegality or the pendency of litiga-
tion'06 and by the convergence of financial materiality with manage-
ment integrity.0 7
102. Levy v. Johnson, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
J 95,899, at 91,324 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 1977).
103. See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 731-32 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Lewis v. Valley, 476 F. Supp. 62, 66
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
104. 454 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
105. Id. at 792.
106. Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l Co., 488 F. Supp. 630 (D. Del. 1980) (failure to
disclose pending securities fraud litigation, a violation of § 14(a)); SEC v. Jos. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (failure to disclose kickbacks to
suppliers; motion to dismiss complaint alleging violations of §§ 13(a), 14(a) and rule
10b-5 denied); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354 F.
Supp. 895 (D. Del. 1973) (failure to disclose in proxy contest the prior convictions of
director nominee of dissident shareholders held to violate § 14(a)); Cooke v. Tele-
prompter Corp., 334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (failure to disclose bribery
conviction of person acting as de facto officer of the company held to render proxy
statement materially misleading). As the district court in Bertoglio explained, the
mere pendency of litigation may be important to shareholders: "The allegations in
these complaints [alleging securities antifraud violations] relate directly to [the proxy
contestant's] discharge of his fiduciary obligations and his forthrightness in certain
securities transactions.. . .Even should [the proxy contestant] ultimately be suc-
cessful in defending against these claims, [the company's] shareholders were entitled
to know that serious allegations, arguably bearing on his fitness for the office he
sought, had been lodged against him." 488 F. Supp. at 661 (citation omitted).
107. In Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354 F.
Supp. 895 (D. Del. 1973), for example, the court explained: "There would be a real
possibility that the FCC would revoke [the company's] television license if one of the
new Board members had. . . a [criminal] record. This information directly affecting
a profitable asset would have a significant propensity to affect a shareholder's vote.
Thus, the failure to so inform the shareholders was a material omission violative of
Rule 14a-9." Id. at 914; see Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp., 334 F. Supp. 467
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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D. Line Item Disclosure Requirements
Finally, it should be noted that whether or not material from a
financial or management integrity standpoint, illegal practices must
be disclosed if called for by specific line item disclosure requirements
in various SEC reporting forms and schedules. l08 Absence of materi-
ality under these circumstances is not necessarily a defense for disclo-
sure deficiencies. Courts have so found for proxy statements'09 and
shareholder reports under section 13(d), l" 0 and the SEC has taken this
position for tender offer filings."'
In a few instances, courts have broadly construed line items dealing
with management remuneration to reach illegal practices. In SEC
v. Kalvex Inc.,"l kickbacks received by a director/officer were found
to be a form of remuneration reportable in proxy solicitations." t3
108. Of course, some line items are expressly preconditioned upon materiality.
See, for example, line items for disclosure of convictions and indictments, inJra note
116.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1978) (without
discussion of materiality, court held that failure to disclose kickbacks would violate
remuneration line item), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Catalano, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,159
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1979) (failure to disclose criminal conviction violated schedule
14B); cf. 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 884-89 (2d ed. 1961); 5 L. Loss, Securities
Regulation 2848-51 (1969 Supp.).
110. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971) (no finding of
materiality), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); SEC v. General Refractories Co., 400
F. Supp. 1248 (D.D.C. 1975) (same); cf. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 462-63 (1976) (indicating that SEC could adopt a proxy rule calling for
specific information, regardless of materiality).
111. Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission, ainicus curiae, at 1-7,
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Hi-Shear Indus., Inc., No. 80-9117 (2d Cir. 1981).
Failure to report information in response to specific line item requirements subjects a
company to an SEC administrative proceeding. Under § 15(c)(4) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1976), for example, the SEC may bring an
administrative proceeding against a reporting company for failure in its annual or
periodic reports "to comply with any [reporting] provision, rule, or regulation in any
material respect." The inquiry in a § 15(c)(4) proceeding, under this formulation,
does not turn on the materiality of information which has been omitted or misstated,
but instead turns upon material compliance with a line item requirement. Thus, total
failure to respond to a line item, even if the information called for were insignificant,
would amount to material noncompliance. It should be noted that administrative
proceedings under § 15(c)(4) do not reach violations of the proxy rules. In private
litigation, moreover, courts may take into account the absence of materiality in
fashioning relief. Cf. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 63-65 (1975) (a
technical violation of the Williams Act does not, in and of itself, require the granting
of injunctive relief).
112. 425 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
113. On these facts the Kalvex court held that defendant did not comply with item
7 of schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1981), which requires disclosure of
direct annual remuneration paid by an issuer to each director or officer whose
aggregate direct remuneration exceeds $40,000, and all interested transactions be-
tween an issuer and any of its officers or directors. 425 F. Supp. at 314.
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Moreover, in a criminal securities fraud case, United States v.
Fields,"4 the Second Circuit restored counts charging an officer with
concealment of kickbacks and short-swing profits from the sale of the
company's securities based upon the applicability of "interested trans-
actions" and "management debt" line items.115
More specific line items require disclosure of criminal convictions,
pending indictments and securities law civil judgments against any
officer or director within the preceding five years."0 Additionally,
corporate activity that puts a company's foreign operations at risk
may fall within the compass of prescriptive line item disclosure," 7 as
will conduct by a government contractor that may trigger a termina-
tion of contracts or a renegotiation of profits." 8
III. PROBLEMS OF PROOF IN ILLEGAL CONDUCT CASES: PRoPosALS
Inseparable from the conceptual underpinnings of a duty to disclose
are practical problems that arise when illegality of corporate conduct
is an element of proof in a securities law case. Decisions reached after
Santa Fe Industries v. Green" 9 involving management fraud illustrate
the dilemma when securities law liability turns on the violation of
other law.12 0  In these cases, securities antifraud liability is in part
114. [1978 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,552 (2d Cir. 1978).
115. Id. at 94,279. At the time, item 7(f) of schedule 14A required disclosure of
"any transaction since the beginning of the issuer's last fiscal year. . .to which the
issuer or any of its subsidiaries was or is to be a part.', in which any of the following
persons had or is to have a direct or indirect material interest ...(1) [a]ny director
or officer of the issuer ...." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1978). Item 7(e) of schedule
14A at the time required disclosure of: "indebted[ness] to the issuer.. . [of] [C]ach
director or officer of the issuer.. .[including] any indebtedness... [arising] under
Section 16(b) of the [Securities Exchange] Act." Id. Under the SEC s current rules,
items 402(e) and 402(f) of regulation S-K, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,418 (1982) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402), set forth disclosure requirements for indebtedness of man-
agement and interested transactions. Failure to disclose in proxy materials the poten-
tial liability of director nominees for short swing profits may also violate the broad
antifraud rule, rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981), governing proxy solicita-
tions. See Rafal v. Geneen, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,505, at 92,441 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1972).
116. The disclosure obligation, however, is expressly predicated on the condition
that a conviction, indictment or civil judgment be "material to an evaluation of the
ability or integrity of any director, person nominated to become a director, or
executive officer of the registrant." Regulation S-K, item 401(f), 47 Fed. Reg. 11,413
(1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.401) (incorporated in form S-1, item 11;
form 10-K, item 10; and schedule 14A, item 6).
117. Regulation S-K, item 101(d)(2), 47 Fed. Reg. 11.405 (1982) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. § 229.101).
118. Id., item 101(c)(1)(ix), 47 Fed. Reg. 11,405 (1982) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 229.101).
119. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
120. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 101.
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intertwined with liability under state law for breach of fiduciary
duty.
The Supreme Court in Santa Fe held that unfairness or constructive
fraud in a "going private" merger, absent an allegation of deception
or manipulation, cannot support rule 10b-5 liability. The Court re-
jected the contention that failure to provide advance notice of the
merger to minority shareholders constituted a material omission, not-
ing the minority's concession that under state law they were powerless
to prevent the merger.12 1
Drawing a negative implication from Santa Fe, several courts have
predicated antifraud liability upon the availability of injunctive relief
under state law when management has made misleading statements
or omissions regarding self-dealing transactions.12 2  The courts are
121. Santa Fe Indus. Inc., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 n.14 (1977); 3 L. Loss,
Securities Regulation 1431 (2d ed. 1961); Note, Rule 10b-5: Elements of a Private
Right of Action, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 541, 554-56 (1968). "[R]espondents do not
indicate how they might have acted differently had they had prior notice of the
merger. Indeed, they accept the conclusion. . . that under Delaware law they could
not have enjoined the merger because an appraisal proceeding is their sole remedy In
the Delaware courts for any alleged unfairness in the terms of the merger. Thus, the
failure to give advance notice was not a material nondisclosure within the meaning of
the statute or. . . Rule [10b-5]." 430 U.S. at 474 n. 14. In the absence of any remedy
other than appraisal, failure to provide advance notice of unfair terms could not have
caused injury to minority shareholders. See Jacobs, How Sante Fe Affects lOb-5's
Proscriptions Against Corporate Mismanagement, 6 See. Reg. L.J. 3, 27 (1978).
Although framed in terms of materiality, the answer to the "advance disclosure"
argument might have been better cast in terms of causation, an essential element of a
private action under rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523 (5th
Cir. 1978); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1053 (1977); Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 840 (1975); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
122. Deception in management fraud cases arises in essentially two situations.
First, state law may require that officers or directors with a self-interest in a corpo-
rate transaction disclose that fact to disinterested directors or, in their absence, to the
shareholders. Failure to do so, or affirmatively misstating the existence of self-
interest, may give rise to securities antifraud liability under rule 10b-5. See, e.g.,
Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 645-47 (3d Cir. 1980);
Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606
F.2d 602, 613-14 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980); Kidwell ex rel.
Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567
F.2d 209, 220-21 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). Under rule lOb-
5, of course, the self-dealing transaction must involve the purchase or sale of secur-
ities. Cf. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 221 n.10 (2d Cir. 1977) (reserving the
question whether rule 10b-5 liability might apply even in the absence of any secur-
ities transaction by the corporation if the self-dealing were to operate as a fraud on
the market as a whole), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). Second, state law may
require that shareholder consent be acquired before a particular corporate transac-
tion may be carried out. As discussed, misleading shareholders about officer or
director self-interest may create liability under rule 14a-9. See supra notes 72-83 and
accompanying text. In this situation, liability attaches whether or not self-dealing
involves a securities transaction.
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divided, however, on precisely what a plaintiff must prove to sustain a
securities law claim. Some have held that the plaintiff need show only
the availability of injunctive relief under state law, ,;3 others require a
showing of "reasonable basis" or "reasonable probability" of success
on the state law claim; 124 still others require proof that plaintiff would
in fact prevail in state court. 2 5  The upshot of these cases is to
require, in effect, a "mini-trial" of the state law action for breach of
fiduciary duty-truly an ironic twist, given the policy reasoning of
Santa Fe. 126
.Difficulties of proof also obtain when securities law liability turns
on legality of corporate conduct under detailed federal regulatory
schemes.' 2 7 This concern, although unarticulated, apparently influ-
123. See, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922-23 (2d Cir. 1980): Goldberg v.
Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 219 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 1069 (1978):
Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5 and the New Federal-
ism, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 263, 291-94 (1980).
124. See, e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa.. Inc., 616 F.2d 641. 647 (3d
Cir. 1980) ("reasonable probability"): Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Co. v.
American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602, 614 (5th Cir. 1979) (-reasonable
basis"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980). The Third Circuit in Healey stated: "i[le
frame the test in terms of a reasonable probability for two reasons. First, we believe
absolute certainty to be both an impossible goal as well as an impracticable standard
for a jury to implement. Second, in most cases the state remedy will be a preliminary
injunction, which looks to the likelihood of ultimate success." 616 F.2d at 647.
125. Kidwell ex tel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1294 (9th Cir. 1979).
126. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Part IV of its
opinion, the Santa Fe Court identified several policy considerations, apart from the
language of the statute, which weighed against recognition of a rule lOb-5 action.
Chief among these was the Court's concern that "extension of the federal securities
laws would overlap and quite possibly interfere with state corporate law." particu-
larly with respect to the development of state law fiduciary principles. Id. at 479. At
the same time, the Court recognized that "the existence of a particular state-law
remedy is not dispositive of the question whether Congress meant to provide a similar
federal remedy." Id. at 478. A further paradox in post-Santa Fe cases is that the
unavailability of a state law remedy is dispositive of a federal securities law claim.
127. This is not to suggest that thorny issues under state fiduciary law are not
presented in securities antifraud cases. Thus, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
assumption in Santa Fe, Delaware decisions reached after Santa Fe have established
that minority shareholders enjoy not only appraisal rights but may enjoin a merger
on grounds of unfairness and lack of valid business purpose. See Roland Int'l Corp. v.
Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1036-37 (Del. 1979); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969,
980 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. Int'l Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1122 (Del. 1977);
Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freez eouts, 87 Yale L.J. 1354,
1354-56 (1978); Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 123, at 278-80: see also Goldberg v.
Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 224 n.9 (2d Cir. 1977) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (New York
choice-of-law rule applicable to Panamanian corporation with offices in New York
and Bermuda is unsettled), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1978): Maher v. Zapata
Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,549 (S.D. Tex. May 27,
1980) (assuming, in the absence of controlling precedent, that Delaware Supreme
Court would reject use of business judgment rule to dismiss shareholder's derivative
suit under rule 14a-9).
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enced the decision in Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Un-
ion v. J.P. Stevens & Co. 128 and was clearly identified as a basis for the
decision in SEC v. Chicago Helicopter Industries, Inc. 120 More prob-
lematic still are antifraud cases that turn on legality under foreign law
of activities pursued abroad by United States corporations.130 Piggy-
backing securities law duties onto other legal standards also implicates
considerations of comity. Agencies that enforce federal labor or bank-
ing laws, for example, are expected to develop an expertise in their
respective areas of jurisdiction and to apply their expertise in shaping
the development of the law by exercising prosecutorial discretion in
individual cases. Courts confronted by securities antifraud claims
based on unadjudicated violations of other statutes should quite un-
derstandably have reservations about judging collaterally the legality
of conduct under these statutes.
Reconciling the securities laws with the operation of other laws and
easing problems of proof, however, can be advanced in at least four
ways. First, the Texas Gulf Sulphur materiality standard for predic-
tive disclosure can be refined. Under that standard, disclosure of
unlawful but unadjudicated conduct may be required even if it is not
likely that the conduct will be detected and prosecuted. Financial
accounting standards, however, are more circumscribed. To provide
benchmarks for predictive disclosure in this area, the accounting pro-
fession adopted in 1975 a financial accounting standard, FASB 5,111
which mandates disclosure of an unasserted litigation claim only
when both parts of a two-prong test are met. Disclosure is required
when there is (1) a reasonable probability that the claim will be
asserted, and (2) a reasonable possibility that the claim, if asserted,
will lead to an adverse result for the company.132 Under FASB 5, no
128. 475 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot per curiam, 638 F.2d 7
(2d Cir. 1980).
129. No. 79-C-0469 (N.D. Il. Jan. 18, 1980), discussed in Sec. Beg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 595, at A-4 (Mar. 18, 1981). In Chicago Helicopter, the court stated:
"Subject matter jurisdiction of this action is premised on a violation of the securities
law, not the banking laws .... [I]n the absence of an adjudicated finding of
illegality of [the challenged banking] transaction, the Court is not at liberty to
assume or make its own finding of such illegality." Slip op. at 5.
130. See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (legality of
political payments under Italian law); Note, Disclosure of Corporate Payments
Abroad and the Concept of Materiality, 4 Hofstra L. Rev. 729, 741-44 (1976)
(materiality of foreign bribes).
131. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Accounting for Contingencies, State-
ment of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 (FASB 5) (Mar. 1975).
132. Id. Where both prongs are met, and if the amount of loss can be reasonably
estimated, FASB 5 requires a loss accrual to be charged to income in the company's
financial statements. If no reasonable estimate can be made, FASB 5 requires disclo-
sure of the loss contingency in a footnote to the financial statement. In its Statement
of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, 31
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disclosure in financial statements is required of a litigation claim the
assertion of which is no more than "reasonably possible."133 To be
sure, FASB 5 provides guidance in the preparation of financial state-
ments, but its mathematical exactitude probably renders it an unduly
arbitrary measure of a company's more general disclosure obliga-
tions.13 4  A more workable standard would steer a middle course
between Texas Gulf Sulphur and FASB 5, by requiring disclosure of
unlawful activities when (1) there is a substantial possibility that the
conduct-will be detected or will give rise to litigation, and (2) material
economic loss would likely result upon such occurrence. Under this
standard, companies would assess their disclosure duties within a
limited range of probabilities, much as they do in reaching a variety of
other decisions.
A second step is to fuse the management integrity and financial
materiality standards. In cases of self-dealing, the groundwork has
already been laid. 35  More careful inquiry into the financial impor-
tance of management integrity must be undertaken in non-self-deal-
ing cases. Plaintiffs should be called upon to demonstrate how assert-
edly unlawful conduct, arguably undertaken to enhance corporate
profitability, in fact has impaired, or threatens to impair, profitability
in a material way. Plaintiffs may perhaps meet this burden of proof
by showing that a company could not successfully compete without
resort to unlawful means, or that discovery and successful prosecution
of the unlawful conduct is likely to result in the loss of major contracts
or valuable licenses or franchises. If a plaintiff is not held to such a
requirement, courts may rightly perceive that a plaintiff, by resort to
the securities laws, seeks simply to circumvent state law limitations
which preclude shareholder claims based solely upon corporate mis-
management. Focusing on the financially important aspects of man-
Bus. Law. 1709 (1976), issued in response to FASB 5, the American Bar Association
cautioned its members that "[the] judgment [of whether an unasserted claim will be
asserted] will infrequently be one within the professional competence of lawyers and
therefore the lawyer should not undertake such assessment except where such judg-
ment may become meaningful because of the presence of special circumstances, such
as catastrophes, investigations, and previous public disclosure. . . . In light of the
legitimate concern that the public interest would not be well served by resolving
uncertainties in a way that invites the assertion of claims or otherwise causes unneces-
sary harm to the client and its stockholders, a decision to treat an unasserted claim as
'probable' of assertion should be based only upon compelling judgment." Id. at 1723.
133. FASB 5, supra note 131.
134. The SEC employed FASB 5 as a yardstick in one recent administrative
proceeding but at the same time did not disavow the applicability of the broader
TGS standard. See In re United States Steel Corp., [ 1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,319; see also Securities Act Release No. 6130 (Sept. 27,
1979), 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,507B (interpretive release on environmental
disclosure).
135. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
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agement integrity would lessen the likelihood that other courts would
follow the reasoning of decisions like J.P. Stevens.
Third, where facts bearing upon management integrity but not tied
to financial materiality do not fall within specific line item reporting
requirements, a presumption should be available to corporations that
disclosure is generally not required in periodic reports or other docu-
ments filed with the SEC. For example, the Commission's line item
reporting requirement for criminal convictions within the past five
years suggests, by negative implication, that convictions of less recent
vintage ordinarily need not be disclosed in filings with the SEC.
Careful deliberation that precedes adoption of specific reporting re-
quirements by the SEC, and the process of soliciting and weighing the
views of public commentators, would be undermined if issuers there-
after were not entitled to place at least some weight on lines that the
SEC has specifically drawn.
Finally, the SEC, in enforcement actions that turn on violation of
other federal law, should attempt to coordinate in some way with
those other agencies entrusted with primary jurisdiction over particu-
lar areas. The interests of comity and judicial economy could be
served, for example, if the SEC and another federal agency were to
file a joint complaint charging securities law and substantive viola-
tions. When another agency decides for its own reasons not to file a
contemporaneous enforcement action, the agency may nonetheless
participate as amicus curiae in the SEC's case to advise the court on
interpretive matters. At the very least, the SEC should advise the
court before which the securities case is pending whether any agency
with primary jurisdiction over the substantive law that has allegedly
been violated objects to prosecution of the SEC's complaint. 30
There may, of course, be additional ways in which problems of
proof and interests of comity can be met in a constructive, practical
fashion. When securities law claims are based upon unadjudicated
violations of other federal law, the SEC, as a governmental body,
must demonstrate its sensitivity to the prerogatives of sister federal
agencies and recognize the reluctance of the courts to judge collater-
ally the illegality of corporate conduct under separate substantive
statutes. By taking these steps, the SEC, in particular, and all other
plaintiffs can avoid distortion in the application by the courts of the
standard of materiality in the securities law disclosure context.
136. An analogy may be drawn to procedures employed in litigation in which
applicability of the Act of State doctrine under international law is at issue. In these
cases, the State Department advises the court whether or not the private claim should
be heard. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976);
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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CONCLUSION
The analytical model for assessing materiality under the securities
laws of conduct that may be illegal under other governing law is
continuing to evolve. But on the basis of decided cases, administrative
rulings and the legislative purposes underlying the securities laws, the
contours of such a model have begun to emerge. As a threshold
proposition, engagement by a company or its officers in illegal or
"questionable" practices is not per se material. Accordingly, absent a
specific line item directive, a disclosure requirement does not auto-
matically arise. A duty to disclose does attach, however, if the omis-
sion of information pertaining to illegal, or assertedly illegal, practices
would render financial information that has been set forth in an SEC
filing materially misleading. Financial materiality is implicated when
the unlawful conduct would subject the company to substantial costs,
fines or penalties, or if the stability of company earnings would other-
wise be jeopardized.
Although illegal practices may pose no immediate financial risk,
materiality may be found, particularly in the proxy context, when
such practices adversely reflect upon the integrity of management.
Instances of self-dealing by management clearly fall within the com-
pass of "integrity of management" materiality. Whether this standard
embraces other kinds of unlawful practices, particularly conduct un-
dertaken to further the interests of the corporation, is a question that
has thus far left the courts divided. In this regard, one may expect the
courts in the future to be reluctant to extend the boundaries of the
"'integrity" theory, because to do so-absent some showing that infor-
mation is pertinent from an economic standpoint-will likely be
viewed as needlessly impinging upon the operation of other legal
schemes.
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